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Introduction 
 
 
India’s Response to the Chinese Belt and 
Road Initiative 
New Partners and New Formats 
Christian Wagner and Siddharth Tripathi 
India has been exploring the response to China’s growing influence and its Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) for long. The contours to find viable alternatives to this challenge 
are now becoming visible. India is slowly transitioning to increased – and previously 
unthinkable – cooperation with other states in South Asia. Within its extended neigh-
bourhood, India has developed new formats of cooperation with Japan, the USA and 
Australia that are directly or indirectly positioned against China. For Germany and 
Europe, this shift in Indian foreign policy opens new avenues for cooperation. 
 
For decades, China has been both a focal 
point of India’s foreign policy and its main 
rival on the international scene. The defeat 
in the 1962 war, China’s economic, military 
and political support for Pakistan, and inci-
dents at the disputed border, as in Doklam 
in summer 2017, have contributed to India’s 
concerns vis-à-vis China. At the same time, 
China is also India’s largest bilateral 
trading partner. Both states are also mem-
bers of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa) and the Shanghai Co-
operation Organisation (SCO), among others; 
and they frequently take similar stances 
towards industrialised nations in inter-
national trade and climate negotiations. 
India, like China, has traditionally har-
boured ambitions to be a great power – for 
instance, for years it has demanded a per-
manent seat in the UN Security Council. 
India’s nuclear potential underlines its great 
power ambitions. However, unlike China, 
it only has the foreign policy resources of 
a middle power at best. Despite its strong 
economic growth in recent years, India was 
only ranked 131st on the 2015 Human 
Development Index (China was 90th). With 
about 900 people in its diplomatic service, 
a figure substantially lower than that of 
Japan or China, India is barely able to pur-
sue its foreign policy initiatives. 
South Asia 
South Asia has traditionally been seen as 
India’s “natural” sphere of influence. 
During the past few years, however, China 
has invested massively in the region as part 
of its Belt and Road Initiative. Its flagship 
project is the China-Pakistan Economic 
SWP Comment 7 
January 2018 
2 
Corridor (CPEC), under which China will 
support India’s regional archrival Pakistan 
with around $54 billion until 2030. China 
invested around $14 bn in infrastructure 
projects in Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2015. 
The Chinese government has pledged 
$38 bn to Bangladesh and planned invest-
ments and credits for Nepal of more than 
$8 bn. Indian security experts see India’s 
influence in the region to be dwindling as 
a consequence and fear the country will 
be encircled by Chinese bases (the so-called 
String of Pearls) in neighbouring states, 
including port projects in Gwadar (Paki-
stan) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka). 
Chinese investments in South Asia repre-
sent a challenge to which India’s foreign 
policy has not been able to find a suitable 
response. Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi did invite all the heads of government 
of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) to his inauguration 
in May 2014 in order to emphasize the im-
portance of his “Neighbourhood First” Policy. 
However, despite some successes – for in-
stance in relations with Bangladesh – this is 
still not an adequate response to Chinese 
investment in India’s neighbourhood. India 
is one of the few Asian states not taking 
part in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
A series of new developments points to 
a shift in India’s South Asia policy. In 2016, 
India and the US agreed on closer coopera-
tion in their development policy towards 
third states, including states in South Asia. 
Thus, in Afghanistan, United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) sup-
ports the activities of the Indian women’s 
organisation Self-Employed Women’s Asso-
ciation (SEWA). India also cooperates with 
the United States on a project concerning 
transmission lines in Nepal, and with Japan 
on constructing a liquid-gas pipeline in Sri 
Lanka. 
These new forms of cooperation indicate 
a shift from India’s previous foreign policy, 
especially vis-à-vis neighbouring states. Since 
its independence in 1947, India has seen it-
self as the primary regional power in South 
Asia. It has therefore used a wide range of 
political, economic and military means to 
intervene in the domestic political conflicts 
of its neighbours, including Nepal, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka and the Maldives. 
The Indira Doctrine, named after former 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, stipu-
lated that domestic political conflicts in 
neighbouring states should be resolved ex-
clusively with India’s help, without involv-
ing extra-regional great powers. From an 
Indian perspective, the record of these 
interventions is mixed at best. Despite its 
economic and military superiority, India 
has rarely managed to settle neighbour-
hood conflicts in its own favour. All neigh-
bouring states have tried – in various ways 
and with varying intensity – to internation-
alise their bilateral conflicts with India, 
usually through closer cooperation with 
the United States or China. Relations with 
India are a controversial topic in all neigh-
bouring countries. Due to their religious, 
linguistic or ethnic common ground with 
India, issues of national identity always 
arise. Thus, the military regime in Bangla-
desh fostered the emergence of a Bangla-
deshi nationalism emphasising religion in 
the 1980s, thereby demarcating itself from 
Bengali nationalism, which stressed cul-
tural similarities with India. 
In the 1990s, the economic liberalisation 
caused a change in India’s South Asia policy. 
Since then, Indian governments have no 
longer seen the region purely in terms of 
security, but increasingly also as part of the 
rapidly growing Indian market. Since the 
2000s, India has relied on expanding 
regional connectivity to boost low levels 
of intra-regional trade.  
India’s new cooperation in the region 
with Western states and Japan also aims to 
counteract its dwindling influence through 
the creation of new formats. Thus the Indian 
Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar 
declared that its smaller neighbours seemed 
to feel safer if there were also “other states 
in the room” alongside India. To that ex-
tent, the long-held belief that South Asia is 
India’s “natural” sphere of influence should 
gradually disappear. 
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India’s Extended Neighbourhood 
in Asia 
India understands its extended neighbour-
hood to encompass the area between the 
Indian Ocean, Central Asia, East and South-
east Asia (see SWP-Studie 20/2016). Prime 
Minister Modi upgraded the “Look East” 
policy introduced in the 1990s to an “Act 
East” policy in 2014, in rivalry with China 
and to promote foreign trade. Its objective 
is to intensify economic, political and 
military relations with Japan and member 
states of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). 
The shift in Indian commitment in its 
extended neighbourhood is evident in new 
or revived bilateral and multilateral for-
mats. During US president Donald Trump’s 
Asia trip, he met the heads of government 
of Japan, Australia and India in Manila in 
November 2017 to revitalise the former 
quadrilateral initiative (Quad). This group 
first coalesced ten years earlier but has 
been unable to establish itself due to dif-
ferences in foreign policy conceptions. 
As in 2007, the focus of the Quad mem-
bers is again on China. The states are look-
ing for new ways to oppose China’s more 
assertive policies, such as the Belt and Road 
Initiative, the foundation of the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB), and 
China’s rejection of the verdict delivered 
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
The Hague on the territorial conflicts in 
the South China Sea. 
India is very interested in reviving the 
Quad and has markedly expanded its bilate-
ral economic, military and political rela-
tions with the three other states in recent 
years. However, Quad members were un-
able to agree upon a common declaration 
at their meeting. Nor have they found a 
joint policy concerning maritime security 
and connectivity. 
An entirely new form of bilateral co-
operation is the Asia-Africa Growth Corri-
dor (AAGC), wherein India and Japan are 
attempting to create a counter model to 
the Chinese BRI. The AAGC primarily tar-
gets the Indian Ocean and its coastal states. 
India has been promoting the idea of a 
security provider in the Indian Ocean since 
2009. In the face of China’s increased pres-
ence, India has intensified its military co-
operation with the island states of Mauri-
tius, the Seychelles, Maldives and Comoros. 
In 2014 the Modi government created the 
Mausam project as a counterweight to BRI 
and since 2015 Modi has been promoting 
the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in 
the Region) concept. 
Compared to China, India has noticeably 
fewer political, economic and military re-
sources at its disposal to implement its 
foreign policy ideas. Its close economic and 
political cooperation with Japan as part of 
the AAGC provides India with a new instru-
ment for enforcing its ambitions in the 
Indian Ocean. 
The International North-South Transport 
Corridor (INSTC) is a new trilateral project, 
which Russia, Iran and India have promul-
gated since 2015. The corridor, which begins 
at the Iranian port of Chabahar, is supposed 
to give India access to Afghanistan, Central 
Asia and Russia. As a result of its conflict 
with India, Pakistan has so far refused to 
allow an overland link to Central Asia and 
has blocked all attempts by Afghan govern-
ments to trade directly with India. In May 
2016 the Indian government allocated $500 
million for developing Chabahar. The port 
city is only about 70 km from the Pakistani 
port of Gwadar, where China’s “new Silk 
Road” and “maritime Silk Road” meet. In 
late October 2017, India shipped its first 
load of wheat to Afghanistan via Chabhar. 
The corridor should advance Indian-Afghan 
trade in the coming years. The Indian gov-
ernment thereby also underlines its ability 
to initiate successful infrastructure projects 
with other states. 
New Opportunities for 
Germany and Europe 
In the face of China’s continued challenge, 
there is little doubt that India will continue 
to be significantly interested in cooperating 
with other states. Given its limited resources, 
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it has fewer options for pursuing its objec-
tives in economic policy or its strategic am-
bitions, which aim inter alia to establish a 
multi-polar order in Asia. India’s coopera-
tion with other states in South Asia is a 
novelty in its foreign policy. Within the ex-
tended neighbourhood, bilateral and mini-
lateral formats provide a new set of instru-
ments enabling India to take a stance against 
China in its foreign policy. 
This creates new opportunities for co-
operation with India. Joint declarations 
at India’s summits with Italy, the EU and 
Japan already contained relevant state-
ments. The EU and India have moreover 
emphasised their willingness to cooperate 
militarily in the Indian Ocean, particularly 
off the coast of Somalia as part of Operation 
Atalanta. Among the EU member states, 
France maintains the closest relations with 
India in terms of security policy and has the 
greatest overlap with India in terms of geo-
strategy. The two states have been strategic 
partners since 1998 and have long culti-
vated extensive cooperation in nuclear and 
armaments policy. France’s overseas depart-
ments, such as Réunion, and its member-
ship in the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) 
make it an essential European partner and 
an obvious choice for cooperation in the 
Indian Ocean. 
Germany has very good economic rela-
tions with India and has significantly 
expanded its business and technological 
contacts during the last few years. If India 
agreed to closer cooperation with third 
states in South Asia, it would share Ger-
many’s interest in strengthening democratic 
and civil-society structures in states such as 
Afghanistan or Nepal and in fighting grow-
ing religious extremism, for example in 
Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean 
has also moved into Berlin’s foreign-policy 
sights, increasing its economic and security 
convergence with New Delhi. By cooper-
ating with India to promote the maritime 
economy or protect maritime resources in 
the Indian Ocean island states, Germany 
would play to everyone’s economic inter-
ests. This could also give a fresh impetus to 
India’s strategic partnership with the EU 
and its member states. 
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